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THE DUTY TO WARN IN AVIATION LAW:
A NEW TORT THEORY IN THE AFTERMATH
OF PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT 103"

I.

INTRODUCTION

I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on
external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the
instrument of my own, not of other men's, acts of will.
I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by
reasons, by conscious purposes which are my own, not
by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I
wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking,
willing, active being, bearing responsibility for his
choices and able to explain them by reference to his own
ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I
believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I
am made to realize that it is not.'
On December 21, 1988, the world was devastated by the news
that Pan American Airlines Flight 103, en route from London to New
York, had exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland. 2 The 259 passengers
comprised a microcosm of America.' There were college students, Wall
Street executives, a director of a prestigious women's college, a United
Nations diplomat, mothers, fathers, and children." Prior to December
21, 1988, passengers of Pan American Flight 103 were not privy to any
of the relevant terrorist-related information known by the United States
* This Note is in memory of my parents, Helen and Andrew Dokas, and the
passengers of Pan American Flight 103.
1. Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for The Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1555 n.63 (1970) (citing I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS
oF LIBERTY 16 (1958)).
2. Whitney, Jetliner in Crash Blew Apart in Air, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1988, at
Al, col. 6.
3. Id.
4. Whitney, Jetliner Carrying258 to U.S. Crashesin Scottish Town, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 22, 1988, at A16, col. 5 [hereinafter Jetliner Carrying 258].
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government. The passengers were victimized by an aviation system
which placed more value on classifying information than on providing
important information to travelers. The United States asserted it was
providing for the common defense of airline travelers, although in fact it
6
did not.
The bombing of Flight 103 has been termed "the worst securityrelated disaster in U.S. civil aviation history." 7 The severity of the
Flight 103 disaster mandates a response from the American legal system
by restructuring aviation laws. The premise of this Note is not that the
government and the airlines have an affirmative duty to warn passengers
of terrorist activities or threats. That notion could be defeated by the
government's right to classify information for national security purposes.'
Similar to psychiatry and areas of the law such as drug products liability
and informed consent, the airline passenger has a right to know the
potential dangers to which he or she is subjecting him or herself.' This
right to know should not depend on the level of sophistication of present
day airline security. Rather, the duty should be a constant, a right of
every American airline traveler to know about credible sabotage threats
regarding his or her flight. As a result, an airline traveler could make an
informed decision whether to continue with his original flight plans or opt
for another mode of transportation. Failure to warn by the government
and/or airlines should be considered an allowable claim under existing tort
law. An American traveler's rights under the Constitution and the law of
the land should not end at the airport gates.

5. Cushman, Pan Am Was Told of Terror Threat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1988, at
Al, col. 5.
6. See id. at A16, col. 4.
7.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM, REPORT TO

THE PRESIDENT 14 (May 15, 1990) [hereinafter COMMISSION].
8. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per
curiam). "[lit is elementary that the successful conduct of international diplomacy and
the maintenance of an effective national defense require both confidentiality and
secrecy." id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Cheh, Judicial Supervision of
Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom ofExpressionfor Government Employees and the
Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690, 691
(1984).
9. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("True consent
to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon
each.").
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On December 21, 1988, Pan American Flight 103 originated in
Frankfurt, West Germany, on a Boeing 727.10 The flight later
transferred to a Boeing 747 at London's Heathrow Airport11 where it
departed at 6:25 p.m.12 At 7:03 p.m., Flight 103 exploded 31,000 feet
in the air over the Sherwood Crescent section of Lockerbie, Scotland. 13
An explosion tore through the lower fuselage in front of the left wing of
the plane and resulted in the deaths of 259 people aboard as well as 11 on
14
the ground.
The history of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 can be traced
back to October 1988.15 It was at that time that West German police
raided a camp of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command, a Middle Eastern terrorist group.16 While detaining fourteen
members of the Popular Front and seizing some explosives, 7 the police
discovered a Toshiba "Boombeat" Model 453 radio-cassette player packed
with explosives and a barometric triggering device."8 Armed with this
information, the West Germans held a meeting in early November
1988,"9 in which security experts from many European countries
received information explaining the construction of a Toshiba radio10. Cushman, British Conclude Cassette Player Held Pan Am Bomb, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 6 [hereinafter British Conclude].
11. Whitney, supra note 2, at A16, col. 5.
12. COMMISSION, supra note 7.
13. Whitney, supra note 2, at A16, col. 5; see COMMISSION, supra note 7; see also
Jetliner Carrying 258, supra note 4, at A16, col. 1 (statement of retired policeman, Bob
Glaster) ("There was a ball of fire 300 ft. into the air, and debris was falling from the
sky.").
14. British Conclude, supra note 10; see COMMISSION, supra note 7 (there were 259
fatalities although there was a discrepancy in earlier reports as to whether the fatalities
totaled 258 or 259).
15. Aviation Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the
Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation, United States Senate, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 54 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings 11 (statement of Clayton E. McManaway,
Associate Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State).
16. Id. at 53.
17. Id. at 54.
18. Smolowe, Late Alarums, Failed Alerts, TIME, Mar. 27, 1989, at 53.
19. Id.
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cassette bomb and warnings about the potential uses of such bombs.'
The Hessen State Authority which controls Frankfurt airport sent a telex
to United States airlines that specifically detailed the Toshiba bomb
device.2" The telex also cautioned that such a device was probably
designated for airplanes.' In addition, the Popular Front had previously
used such a device to sabotage airplanes.' Therefore, it was presumed
that they would act similarly in the near future.'
On November 18, 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) issued an Aviation Security Bulletin to airlines cautioning about
explosives which could be hidden in cassette recorders.' It contained
a detailed configuration of the Toshiba bomb device and a warning that
it would be difficult to detect with an ordinary airport X-ray machine.'
Because the bomb could easily slip by airport security, the bulletin
strongly suggested that airlines increase their security proceduresY In
particular, it emphasized implementing measures for tighter controls on
matching baggage with passengers. 28 What was not accounted for was
a method to verify which airlines had been alerted to the information
contained in the bulletin. 2 On November 22, 1988, the British issued
a similar warning to their airlines and airports.30
On December 5, 1988, at 11:45 a.m., an anonymous caller
phoned the American Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, and warned that
within the next two weeks, there would be an attempt to bomb a Pan
American plane flying from Frankfurt, West Germany, to the United
States.3 On December 7, 1988, the United States embassy in Helsinki
20. COMMIsSION, supra note 7, at 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.; see Hearings 1, supra note 15, at 54.
26. COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 7.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. id.
30. Smolowe, supra note 18; see CarriersWere Warned of Cassette bomb; FAA
Requires Approval of Foreign Plans, AmR SAFETY L. & TECH., Mar. 21, 1989, at 3.
31. See, e.g., PrimetimeLive: PanAmerican Flight 103 (ABC television broadcast,
Nov. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Primetime Live].
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sent a cable to the State Department informing them of the threat. 2 In
turn, the FAA issued FAA security bulletin ACS 88-22.13 Upon
receiving this unclassified bulletin, members of the Moscow embassy
recognized that the warning was specific as to the carrier, route, and time
period.'
Therefore, on December 13, 1988, the Moscow embassy
deviated from customary practice and posted the warning prominently at
the embassy.35 The traditional United States policy was not to warn the
general public, but to instead alert security officials in the airline industry
and embassy officials.' On December 9, 1988, the Department of State
32. Aviation Security: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1989) [hereinafter
Hearings 2] (statement of the State Department); see COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 9.
33. Hearings 2, supra note 32.
34. Cushman, supra note 5; COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 9.
35. Primetime Live, supra note 31, at 5 (Karen Decker, Consular Assistant at the
United States Embassy in Moscow, commented on the Dec. 13, 1988, posting of the
warning) ("There was a real push in the Embassy community to make sure that
everybody was aware that there had been a terrorist threat made, and that people flying
Western carriers going through such points as Frankfurt should change their tickets.");
see also Cushman, supra note 5.
Text of the posted security bulletin:
TO: All Embassy Employees
SUBJECT: Threat to Civil Aviation
Post has been notified by the FAA
(Federal Aviation Administration) that on
December 5, 1988, an unidentified individual
telephoned a U.S. diplomatic facility in Europe
and stated that sometime within the next two
weeks there would be a bombing attempt against
a Pan American aircraft flying from Frankfurt to
the United States.
The FAA reports that the reliability of
the information cannot be assessed at this point,
but the appropriate police authorities have been
notified and are pursuing the matter. Pan Am
has also been notified.
In view of the lack of confirmation of
this information, post leaves to the discretion of
individual travelers any decisions on altering
personal travel plans or changing to another
American carrier. This does not absolve the
traveler from flying an American carrier.
COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 10.
36. See Primetime Live, supra note 31, at 14.
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forwarded the security bulletin to all European diplomatic posts," 7 and

the Department of Defense transmitted it to security units worldwide.3

III.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

The FAA is the governmental agency responsible for airline
security." Under the Air Transportation Security Act, the Administrator
of the FAA prescribes rules to protect persons and property aboard
aircrafts.' The Act permits the Administrator to prescribe regulations
that prohibit disclosure of information that would be detrimental to the
safety of airline passengers. 1 The purpose of the Air Transportation
Security Act is to protect passengers against criminal violence and aircraft
terrorism while also balancing the public's interest in the promotion of
safe air transportation.'
The FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security and the FAA
Intelligence division decipher terrorist information gathered through

37. Id.at 8.
38. COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 8 ("By conservative estimate, thousands of U.S.
Government employees saw the Helsinki threat information."); British Conclude, supra
note 10.
39. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357 (1988).
40. Id. § 1357(a)(1) ("The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
shall prescribe such reasonable rules and regulations requiring such practices ... as he
may deem necessary to protect persons and property aboard aircraft operating in air
transportation or intrastate transportation against acts of criminal violence and aircraft
piracy.").
41. Id. § 1357(d)(2).
Notwithstanding section 552 of title 5 relating to
freedom of information, the Administrator shall
prescribe such regulations as he may deem
necessary to prohibit disclosure of any
information obtained or developed in the conduct
of research and development activities under this
subsection if, in the opinion of the
Administrator, the disclosure of such information
(C) would be detrimental to the safety of
persons traveling in air transportation.
Id.
42. Id. § 1357(a).
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intelligence channels.' After consulting with intelligence agencies, the
FAA determines whether to formulate a security bulletin." These FAA
security bulletins are received by FAA officials, security officials at
United States airlines and targeted personnel at United States
embassies.'
The State Department then transmits security cables to
foreign embassies and posts affected by the security threat.' In turn,
officials at these headquarters coordinate and aid United States airlines in
acquiring the assistance of the host government to heighten security in the
affected areas.' 7 To date, regulations have not been implemented to
apprise the public of such security bulletins."
43. Hearings 2, supra note 32, at 14; see 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357(d)(2) (the
information gathered through the intelligence channels falls within the purview of this
section).
44. Hearings 2, supra note 32, at 14.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 15.
47. id.
48. In response to the demands of a political action group composed of families of
the victims of Flight 103, the Senate and the House have passed the Aviation Security.
Improvement Act of 1990. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-604, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (104 Stat.) 3066 (codified at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1301 (1990)).
Provisions of this act require the government to warn the public of credible
threats in civil aviation. Id. § 2(8), 104 Stat. 3067. Guidelines for assessing such
threats would be based upon the following:
(1) the specificity of the threat;
(2) the credibility of intelligence information
related to the threat;
(3) the ability to effectively counter the threat;
(4) the protection of intelligence information
sources and methods;
(5) cancellation, by an air carrier or the
Administrator, of a flight or series of flights
instead of public notification;
(6) the ability of passengers and crew to take
steps to reduce the risk to their safety as a result
of any notification; and
(7) such other factors as the Administrator
considers appropriate.
Id. § 321(e), 104 Stat. 3079.
Despite Congress' attempt to list factors for assessing credible threats, the
Aviation Security Act of 1990 does not have any clause which states that every American
citizen has a right to know about threats to commercial air flight which affects his or her
well-being. The above mentioned factors are subject to multiple interpretations over the
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PUBLIC NOTIFICATION

Despite the passage of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990, the United States' policy to date has not implemented specific
guidelines for public notification of terrorist threats to commercial air

flights. The government defends its policy with the following rationales:
1) warning passengers of terrorist threats would compromise American
security by disclosing to terrorists the extent of the authorities'
knowledge; 2) publicizing the threats might induce "copy cat" threats,

escalating the problem of terrorism to an even higher degree; 3) warning
the public might cause mass cancellations and cripple the airline industry,
regardless of the validity of the threat; and 4) informing the public of
numerous threats makes them less inclined to give the credible threats
credence. 49

There are approximately 30 FAA security bulletins a year that are
classified as credible security threats.'
If a threat to the aviation
industry is deemed to be "specific and credible," 51 and the government
concludes that no measure could be taken to prevent the attack, then the
flight may be cancelled.5

If it is not an American flight, the

years. Therefore, Congress must make a statement which reaffirms an air traveler's
right to self-determination while flying.
49. Cushman, supra note 5, at A16, col. 4; Cushman, Flying Blind with Few
Sources on Security Threats, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1989, § 5, at 3, col. 4 [hereinafter
Flying Blind].
Airline passengers recently exercised their right of self-determination when they
were warned of a threat against their airplane. A bomb threat was made against
Northwest Flight 51 flying on December 30, 1988, from Paris to Detroit. Northwest
gave the 130 passengers the option of selecting an alternate flight without any
ramifications. Only 22 passengers stayed aboard. In fact, those passengers who chose
other flights, "thanked Northwest officials for giving them a choice." Ott, U.S. Court
Confirms Airline Liability Limits, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 8, 1990, at 52.
Similarly, the Airline Passengers Association of North America, which has
approximately 110,000 frequent flyers from over 175 countries as members, advocates
warning the flying public about sabotage threats so they can make an informed decision.
R. Livingston, We Would Rather Know 4-5 (unpublished manuscript available through
the Airline Passengers Association in Virginia).
50. Hearings 1, supra note 15, at 10 (statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato).
51. The State Department is the source of information for any security threats.
Hearings 2, supra note 32, at 49 (statement of the State Department). The FAA with
the assistance of the intelligence agencies, decides whether or not a threat is specific and
credible. If so, they issue a security bulletin. Id.
52. Id. at 9 (statement of Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner).
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government simply advises the flight to be cancelled. 3 If the flight is
not cancelled, the State Department would warn embassies, the press, and
the travelling public of the threat.'
It is questionable what kind of threat the government would deem
specific and credible. Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner
testified that he did not believe that the information surrounding Flight
103 was credible enough to warrant its cancellation.55 In addition, there
were no travel advisory bulletins warning Pan American Flight 103
passengers of the threat.' Therefore, it is obvious that the definition of
"specific and credible" must be reconsidered in order to insure proper
passenger safety. In addition, when the government does not mandate
warnings, there remains the possibility that selective notification will

occur. 7 Some passengers might be deprived of knowing the existence

of a threat if airlines take it upon themselves to warn passengers on a

discretionary basis.5 8 Lastly, relying solely on the airlines to warn
passengers is very idealistic given their financial concerns."
The
government, as an independent third party, must mandate and implement
the duty.
V.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL

The freedom to travel forms the foundation of democracy. As a
concept borrowed from the Magna Carta, the right to travel assured that
53. Hearings],supranote 15, at 51-52 (statement of Clayton E. McManaway, Jr.).
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 50 (statement of Secretary of Transportation Samuel K. Skinner).
56. Id.
57. If the government maintains such a stringent benchmark for "specific and
credible" threats, the possibility exists that embassy employees or government workers
at diplomatic posts will be privy to information simply because of their employment
position. Hearings 2, supra note 32, at 51. This leaves open the possibility that future
relatives of air travelers could ask the same question as a child who lost his brother in
Pan Am Flight 103: "Why did the State Department think that their people were more
important than my brother?" Kreindler, The Pan Am 103 Atrocity, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6,
1989, at 3, col. 1.
58. Cushman, Airlines Urged to Hide Bomb Threats, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990,
at A15, col. 4 [hereinafter Airlines Urged].
59. In response to Northwest warning its passengers of the threat against Flight 51,
Mr. Billy Vincent, former FAA security chief, commented: "I don't know if other
airlines would follow Northwest, given that so many passengers left the flight." Ott,
supra note 49, at 53.
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a person may safely enter and exit his or her homeland without forsaking
allegiance to his or her country.' The right to travel is directly linked
to our right of self-determination because in order for a person to enjoy
self-determination, he or she must be "left to shape his own life as he
thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases. "61
The Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson62 declared the right
to travel to be fundamental.'
The Court stated that as citizens of a

common community, we must enjoy the "right to pass and repass through
every part of it without interruption. "I
The constitutional right of
interstate travel has become virtually unqualified.'
Similarly,
international travel has overarching social ramifications.' Air travel is
no longer a luxury, but rather an instrument of social, political, and
economic existence. 67 Accordingly, in Kent v. Dulles,' the Supreme

Court stated that the freedom to travel outside of one's country is inherent
in the fifth amendment's due process clause.' To facilitate international
travel, the United States government issues passports. This document is

a formal recognition of an individual's American citizenship and acts as
a United States request to foreign governments to enable its citizens to
60. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 & n.12 (1957).
61. Id. at 126 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 197 (1941)).
62. 394 U.S. 618 (1968).
63. Id. at 630; see also Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.
898, 902-03 (1986); Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 n.6
(1985); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972)
(quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)).
64. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630.
65. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1980) (quoting United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966)); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971).
66. Students study abroad, diplomatic ties are advanced, and scientific knowledge
is shared. See Kent, 357 U.S. at 126-27 (quoting Edwards, 314 U.S. at 195-96).
67. Many American companies such as General Motors instructed their employees
to travel only when it is essential. Cushman, IBM Caution on Travel Angers US
Airlines, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1989, at D2, col. 4.
68. 357 U.S. 116 (1957).
69. Id. at 126-27; see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (Court held that claimant, a United States
citizen, did not have a constitutional right to travel to Cuba).
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7
travel safely and freely between and within foreign countries. 0
However, because of the escalation in aviation terrorism, a
passport is no longer a guarantee of safe passage. 7' The President's
Commission on Aviation Security noted that between 1948 and 1958 there

were 97 people killed in airline explosions and 849 passengers killed
between 1979 and 1988.
This increase in aviation terrorism has
dramatically affected the fundamental right to travel. Americans will only
be able to fully enjoy this fundamental right if it is insulated with a duty
to warn passengers of credible terrorist threats.
VI.

RESTRUCTURING THE DUTY TO WARN IN AVIATION LAW

The Restatement (Second) of Torts states that "(1) A common
carrier is under a duty to its passengers to take reasonable action (a) to
protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm."' A carrier's
duty to protect its passengers from acts of third parties is not contingent
upon that carrier's capability to control the third party, but rather on its
special relationship with the passenger.74 Therefore, a carrier must
exercise the highest degree of care under the circumstances. 7
The
70. 22 U.S.C. § 2705 (1988); see also Haig, 453 U.S. at 292-93 (quoting Urtetiqui
v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698 (1835)). Airline travel has become the "lifeblood"
of America. In fact, in 1987 there were approximately 1,095,600,000 air travelers in
the United States. This means that on average, every American flew about four trips
a year. United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cit. 1989).
71. The following list includes only a few of the recent aviation terrorist tragedies:
1974: TWA - explosion over the Ionian Sea; 88 killed.
1979: Indian Airlines - explosion over Madras, India; 8 casualties.
1986: 7WA - explosion near Athens, Greece; 4 people killed and 9 injured.
1987: Korean Air - explosion in flight; 115 people killed.
1988: Pan American Flight 103 - explosion over Lockerbie, Scotland; 259
people aboard and 11 on the ground killed.
1989: UTA - explosion over Sahara, Niger; 171 killed.
1989: Avianca - explosion near Bogota, Colombia; 107 killed.
See COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 164-66.
72. Id.at 114.
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(1)(a) (1965).
74. Martinez Hernandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 283 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976).
75. See generally Britain v. Piedmont Aviation, 254 N.C. 697, 120 S.E. 72 (1961);
Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 845 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir. 1988) (bareboat charterer
liable for infliction of emotional distress imposed by cruise ship photographers on
passenger).
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degree of care required is proportionate to the risk.76 Admittedly, a
common carrier is not an absolute insurer of a passenger's safety, but the

carrier must warn passengers of those risks which are not apparent to the
passenger.' Therefore, courts have held that if a carrier has knowledge
of dangerous people or activities which may confront the traveler at the
point of arrival, it must warn the passenger of such dangers.""

The duty to warn has not been expanded to include terrorist
threats because federal law grants the FAA the responsibility of deciding
what security information the passenger should be told."
The

Administrator of the FAA has the power to pass regulations which
prohibit the disclosure of information when it "would be detrimental to the

safety of persons traveling in air transportation."'

The Air

Transportation Security Act is ironic because its intended purpose is to
classify information to protect passengers,8" yet as evidenced by Pan Am
Flight 103, it is this very classification of information which places an
unknowing passenger at risk. In Fleming v. Delta Airlines,": Judge
Lasker recognized that an airline bears the ultimate responsibility of
whether or not a flight is safe while the decision to fly belongs to each
passenger.'
The airline "owes its passengers the duty to share with
them information ... so that they can choose for themselves whether they

are physically and emotionally capable of undertaking the trip and wish
76. Muratore, 845 F.2d at 348.
77. Luby v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 40, 41 n.I (S.D. Fla. 1986)
(cruise ship had no duty to warn about the existence of a condition that was not
inherently dangerous). This duty to warn is escalated if a reasonable passenger could
not have anticipated the danger. See Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177, 178
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also Tietz v. International Ry., 186 N.Y. 347, 78 N.E.
1083 (1906) (carrier obliged to employ the highest degree of foresight and prudence to
recognize such dangers for its passengers).
78. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1381 (5th Cir.
1980); see also Werndli, 365 So. 2d at 178 (carrier obliged to warn passengers that not
only was the bus terminal in a dangerous area, but it would also be locked upon arrival).
The Fifth Circuit established that airline passengers do consent to certain risks of flight,
such as changes in flight patterns. See Eastern Airlines v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38, 39-40
(5th Cir. 1963). Yet, if the airline knows or should know of the possibility of turbulence
prior to flight, the airline has the duty to warn its passengers. Id.
79. 49 U.S.C. § 1357 (1988).
80. Id. § 1357(d)(2)(C).
81. Id. § 1357(a)(1).
82. 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
83. Id. at 341.
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to do so.""' In essence, Judge Lasker recognized an airline passenger's
right of self-determination.
VII.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN AVIATION LAW

Despite its absence in aviation law, self-determination has been
universally recognized elsewhere.' Both the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights specify, "[aill people have the right of selfdetermination ...

[to] freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural

development."'
Self-determination is rooted in ideals of individual
integrity and freedom of choice." There is a general premise that "[n]o
right is held more sacred

. . .

than the right of every individual to the

possession and control of his own person.""5
A competent individual's right to autonomy has been recognized
in many areas of the law such as those laws involving health and
welfare." Courts have adopted the common law rule that a competent
patient's right to privacy and to control his or her own destiny will
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Comment, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an
Old Doctrine, 22 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 839 (1985). "What is freedom? Freedom is the
right to choose: the right to create for yourself the alternatives of choice. Without the
possibility of choice and the exercise of choice a man is not a man but a member, an
instrument, a thing." Id. at 839 n.l.
86. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5.
87. Britain, Product Honesty is the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and
Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer
Expectation in Determining Product Defects, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 342, 371 nn.118-19
(1984).
88. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
89. See generally Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 416 (Mo. 1988) (en bane),
aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (a competent person's decisions have been accorded substantial weight in the area
of the health and welfare of the individual). John Stuart Mill held the right to selfdetermination as one of the basic values of human existence. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY
271 (1952) ("mhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.").
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consistently outweigh the state's interest in preserving life.' It is only
when incompetent patients are involved that many courts employ the
concept of substituted judgment.9 1 In re Quinlan' held that substituted
judgment insured an incompetent person's right to privacy in life and
death decisions.' The incompetent's right is simply exercised through
a third party' who must then determine as accurately as possible the
decision that the patient would have made if he or she were competent."*
If there is no such evidence, the courts acting as parens patriae have
employed an objective test measuring whether the burden on the patient's
life with treatment is greater than the benefits which the patient gains
from life.
Whether a person is competent or incompetent, courts have
utilized every available means to make the outcome reflect the patient's
right of self-determination. In In re Peter,' the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated:
Medical choices are private, regardless of whether a
patient is able to make them personally or must rely on
a surrogate. They are not to be decided by societal
standards of reasonableness or normalcy. Rather, it is
the patient's preference -- formed by his or her own
90. M. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABELrry-CIvILAND CRIMINAL 599 (1989). In Cruzan,

the Missouri Supreme Court stated that the balance between the state's interest and the
individual's right to privacy shifts in favor of the latter as the degree of bodily invasion
increases. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 413; see also In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981) (the right to refuse treatment is based on the
common law right to informed consent).
91. The Supreme Court stated that an incompetent person is unable to make an
informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right; such a right must be
exercised for her by an individual who assumes the role of "substituted judgment."
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
92.

70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).

93. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.

94. M. PERLIN, supra note 90, at 577-79.
95. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985).
96. M. PERLIN, supra note 90, at 577-79 (some considerations regarding the
removal of life sustaining treatment include whether there was some evidence that the
patient would have refused such treatment if he was competent and the level of
inhumanity imposed by continuing life support).
97. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
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personal experiences -- that should control."

In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,' the United
States Supreme Court stated that "the right of self-determination should
not be lost merely because an individual is unable to sense a violation of
it.""
Because the FAA has the discretion to warn airlines and their
passengers about terrorist threats on an ad-hoc basis, travelers will be
ignorant of most credible threats against their particular flight. 1 By
analogy, this is the type of ignorance to which the Cruzan Court
addressed, and which results in the airlines practicing a form of
"substituted judgment." However, even though substituted judgment has
only been exercised when a person is incompetent, it is still important to
ascertain what the patient would have desired. 1"
Assuming the passengers on Pan American Flight 103 were
competent, they were entitled to the right of self-determination. Yet, they
were not even afforded the basic rights under the law of an incompetent
person.' °3 There was never a concern to ascertain the subjective intent
of each Pan American Flight 103 passenger as to whether they wished to
fly given the terrorist information." °4 Instead, both the airlines and the
government substituted their judgment for the judgment of the passengers
aboard this flight. Therefore, they were all deprived their right to selfdetermination.

VIII.

INFORMED CONSENT AS APPLIED TO AVIATION LAW

Self-determination is the premise behind the doctrine of informed
consent.1 °5 The reasoning behind informed consent is that "[elvery
98. Id. at 373, 529 A.2d at 423; see also M.

PERLIN, supra note 90, at 592.
99. 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
100. Id. at 2848.
101. See Cushman, supra note 5, at Al, col. 6.
102. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360, 486 A.2d at
1229; Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664.
103. Cushman, supra note 5, at Al, col. 6.
104. Id.
105. Informed consent protects the patient against consequences which he would
have avoided by foregoing the treatment. Canterbury v. Spence, 46 F.2d 772, 790
(D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body. " " Informed consent in medical
procedures not only safeguards a patient from unconsented touching but
also imposes standards for medical competency." ° Since the physician
has a monopoly on the information in the traditional doctor-patient
relationship, nondisclosure becomes equivalent to completely removing the
decision from the patient."°
Over the past few decades the medical community has become
more sensitized to the emergence of patient autonomy.1 Prior to the
imposition of informed consent, the patient's only decision was to submit
himself to the doctor's care while all subsequent decisions and control fell
upon the physician. ° The medical profession determined that doctors
should make all medical decisions because patients could not adequately
comprehend the technical sophistication of the medical procedure.'
Under the doctrine of informed consent, physicians must warn
patients of material risks associated with a procedure. 1 2
Simply stated, the doctrine of informed consent imposes
on a physician, before he subjects his patient to medical
treatment, the duty to explain the procedure to the patient
and to warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent
in or collateral to the therapy, so as to enable the patient
to make an intelligent and informed choice about whether
or not to undergo such treatment.'

106. Schloendorffv. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914).
107. See Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 227 n.32 (1985).
108. See id. at 235.
109. Id. Advances in medical technology have greatly expanded the options
available to the patient. The choices now made by the patient often depend on factors
that transcend professional training and knowledge, i.e., values, religion, and
philosophy. Id.
110. Id. at 221 n.6.
111. Id. at 221.
112. Id. at 228.
113. Comment, Drug Products Liability-Duty to Warn, 49 U. PrrT. L. REv. 283,
291 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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Different courts have disagreed on the precise standard in determining if
a risk is material." 4 Jurisdictions which follow the professional
standard rely upon the physician's discretion in deciding which
information he should disclose." 5 The professional standard disclosure
test is whether a reasonable physician in the same or similar circumstances
would have disclosed the relevant information. 1 ' It is thought that only
the physician can assess which risks the patient should be told. 17 In
order to disprove the physician's judgment, a patient must present expert
testimony from the medical community. 118
Other jurisdictions follow the Canterbury v. Spence model of
informed consent which emphasizes a patient's autonomy in decisionmaking.'n The doctor's duty to warn is measured by a societal rather
than a professional standard.'
These jurisdictions allow the patient's
right of self-determination, not the level of sophistication of medical
technology, to shape the boundaries of the duty to warn.'2 Under
Canterbury, any risk which is material to the patient's ultimate decision
must be disclosed." z' A risk is material if "a reasonable person, in what
the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position, would
be likely to attach significance to the risk ...

in deciding whether or not

to forego the proposed therapy."" Since materiality is judged from the
perspective of the reasonable patient and not the reasonable physician,
there is no need to bring in expert testimony.125
A doctor is not obligated to obtain informed consent from a
patient in the following circumstances: 1) if a patient is in need of
emergency care; 2) if the patient waives his right to make such decisions;
3) if a person is incompetent; or 4) if a person would suffer emotionally
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
1981).
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 293-94.

Id.
Britain, supra note 87, at 372.
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
Id.
Id. at 787; see also Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 998 (M.D. Pa.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787.
Id. at 786-87.
Id. at 787.
Id.
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from disclosure of information. "
Similarly, aviation law does not
require passengers to give informed consent before boarding the airplane.
Therefore, an aviation system without a mandatory "duty to warn" can
never result in informed consent from its passengers. A person can only
give true consent if he is allowed to make an informed choice "that entails
an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the'
risks attendant upon each.""
From the perspective of consumer protection, there are few
differences between aviation and medical law. The airline-passenger
relationship, like the doctor-patient relationship, is contractual in
nature. " There is a high degree of reliance by the subordinate party
(patients and air passengers) to the dominant party (physicians and
airlines). It becomes the duty of the dominant party to impart information
which the subordinate party has "every right to expect."' A physician
is not allowed to remain silent simply because supplying the patient with
information may prompt him not to elect such medical procedure."
Yet, the airlines are told not to disclose sabotage threats against the
airlines because it "would throw the international aviation system into a
state of chaos." 3' 1 It is clear that the medical community respects an
individual's right to make his or her own medical choices. 32 The
aviation community does not similarly respect the rights of their
passengers. With the introduction of the Aviation Security Improvement
Act of 1990, aviation law should ideally be restructured to adopt the goals
of the medical field. Every passenger should be allowed to give informed
consent to fly unless it were an emergency, the passenger waived his right
to know, would suffer emotionally from such knowledge, or was
incompetent.133
There are two reasons why aviation law should adopt the
Canterbury standard of "informed consent rather than the professional
standard. First, informed consent is solely for the airline passenger's
126. Sails, 522 F. Supp. at 998; see also Meisel, The "Exceptions"to the Informed
Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decision
Making, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 431-70; Shultz, supra note 107, at 223 n.16.
127. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 (footnote omitted).
128. Shultz, supra note 107, at 223.
129. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782 (footnote omitted).
130. Id. at 789.
131. Airlines Urged, supra note 58, at A15, col. 1.
132. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789.
133. See Salis, 522 F. Supp. at 998.
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benefit. Therefore, the aviation community cannot be in the position 134
to
scrutinize and determine what should be told to the passenger.
Rather, the focus should be on what the reasonable air traveler should be
told. Secondly, in order for the passenger to prevail under a professional
standard, he "would be required to present expert testimony concerning
the normal level of disclosure in a given situation."1 31 Within the
aviation community, this could create a "community of silence."" In
order to avoid paralyzing the aviation industry, the airlines would agree
upon a minimal uniform level of disclosure of information. 137
Under the Canterbury standard, a specific and credible terrorist
threat against an airplane would be of such magnitude that a reasonable
person would deem it material in forming his or her decision of whether
to fly. Ultimately the pain, suffering, expense, and death of the
procedure of flying did fall on the passengers of Pan Am Flight 103.
Since the purpose of medical disclosure "is to protect the patient against
consequences which, if known, he would have avoided by foregoing the
treatment,"1 38 the extension of this doctrine to airline disclosure would
undoubtedly save lives and allow passengers to control their own future.
Without the imposition of informed consent in aviation law, we will
consistently be running the risk of asking in hindsight whether a passenger
would have flown had he known of the terrorist threats against his
airplane.
IX.

DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY AND AVIATION LAW

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency
which regulates the drug industry via the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA).139 The Act requires premarket testing of all new drugs." 4
Before a drug is marketed for the public's use, the FDA requires
"'adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and experience
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 998-99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 998.
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 (footnote omitted).
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1988).
Id. § 355(b), (d).
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to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.""'41
The duty to warn in drug product liability law is broken down
into two categories.142 First, prescription drug manufacturers are
required to warn the prescribing physician of those risks which the
manufacturer knows or should have known are associated with the
drug. 1
This duty to warn extends to information gained through
research, adverse reaction reports, scientific literature, and other
sources. 1W The drug manufacturers may be liable if they either
disregard evidence which is adverse to their product, or fail to
continuously test and research to discover subsequent dangers.145
Prescription drug manufacturers are not obligated to warn the
ultimate consumer if they adequately warn the prescribing physician.'"
The physician then assumes the role of "learned intermediary" and has the
duty to warn the ultimate consumer." 4 The "learned intermediary"
141. Comment, supra note 113, at 300-01 n.123 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(d)
(West Supp. 1987)).
142. For prescription drugs, the manufacturer must warn the prescribing physician,
but not the consuming public. Comment, supra note 113, at 288. On the other hand,
manufacturers of non-prescription drugs and oral contraceptives are obligated to warn
the ultimate consumer. Id. The FDCA defines a prescription drug as "[a] drug intended
for use by man which... because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect
...is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner licensed by law to
administer such drug . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 353(b).
143. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
144. Baker v. Saint Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400,406,421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
145. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 452-53,479 A.2d 374,386-87
(1984); Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
146. See, e.g., Mauldin v. Upjohn Co., 697 F.2d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. The concept of the learned intermediary is as follows:
As a general proposition in products
liability law there is a duty to warn the intended
or foreseeable consumer of a product about its
dangerous aspects. This duty exists even where
there is an intermediary in the chain of
distribution who takes some control over the
product . . . . An important and sound
exception to the requirement that warning be
made to the consumer, however, is made in
products cases in which the intermediary is not
a mere conduit of the product but rather
administers it on an individual basis, or
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translates highly technical drug information for the patient and advises
him or her, thereby allowing the patient to give informed consent to the
ingestion of such medicine.'" Since a prescription drug is distributed
solely on the basis of a physician's authority, the manufacturer has no
other way of reaching potential patients. 49
On the other hand, manufacturers of non-prescription drugs and
oral contraceptives must warn the ultimate consumer directly." The
rationale behind such warnings is that non-prescription drug users, unlike
prescription drug users, are actively involved in the process of deciding
whether or not to use a given drug.' Also, it is more practical for the
recommends it in some way, implying an
independent duty to evaluate the risks and
transmit relevant warnings to the user.
Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RtTGERs
L. REV. 947, 985-86 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
In the case of prescription drugs:
mhe doctor is intended to be an intervening
party in the full sense of the word. Medical
ethics as well as medical practice dictate
independent judgment . . . on the part of the
doctor ....
Were the patient to be given the
complete and highly technical information on the
adverse possibility associated with the use of the
drug, he would have no way to evaluate it, and
... might actually object to the use of the drug,
thereby jeopardizing his life.
Id. at 987 (footnote omitted).
148. The duty of a physician to advisepatients of any dangers of proposed treatment
is known as the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine recognizes the fact that
although patients generally know little about the medical sciences and therefore rely upon
their physician's expertise, it is ultimately the patient's decision whether or not to
proceed with any course of therapy. Comment, supra note 113, at 290-91; see supra
notes 105-38 and accompanying text.
149. Rheingold, supra note 147, at 987.
150. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980).
Regulations set forth examples of consumer-directed labels. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.501
(1986) (oral contraceptives); id. § 310.502 (intrauterine devices); id. § 310.502(a)
(injectable contraceptives); id. § 310.515 (estrogens); id. § 310.516 (progestational drug
products).
151. MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical, 394 Mass. 131, 143, 475 N.E.2d 65,
69 (1985) (distinguishing between patient's minimal involvement in the decision whether
to use a prescription drug and the active role of the consumer regarding the use of oral
contraceptives which relegates the physician to a relatively minor role).
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manufacturer to directly warn the consumer.'
Armed with such
information, the non-prescription user can weigh the risks and benefits
before taking the drug.
The modern trend in drug liability is towards warning the actual
consumer or patient."
With the recognition of the grave risks
accompanying drugs, some courts have even required a prescription drug
manufacturer to warn the ultimate consumer."
The New Jersey
Supreme Court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,55 stated that if a
manufacturer becomes aware of a new-found risk subsequent to
distributing a prescription drug, its responsibility is to take reasonable
steps to notify purchasers and consumers.'
The FDA's goal is to
afford both prescription and non-prescription drug users the means to
157
become informed of the risks and benefits associated with a drug.
Consistent with this approach, the FDA is constantly
creating more
58
effective methods of warning under the circumstances.
Aviation law should be restructured to adopt the standards of drug
product liability. There is a gross disparity in warning requirements
mandated by the FAA as compared with the FDA. While the FDA
imposes requirements upon drug manufacturers to warn of all risks
associated with a drug,159 the FAA holds discretionary power over
152. Id. at 138, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
153. Feldman, 97 N.J. at 457, 479 A.2d at 389 (citing Lukaszewicz v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp. 961 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (manufacturer of oral
contraceptive had duty to warn patients directly of possible side effects); Pharmaceutical
Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1182 (D. Del. 1980), aff'd per curiam, 634
F.2d 106 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding a FDA regulation that required a direct warning to
consumers of prescription drugs containing estrogen)).
154. See, e.g., Feldman, 97 N.J. at 429, 479 A.2d at 374.
155. 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
156. Id. at 456-57, 479 A.2d at 388-89.
157. Comment, supra note 113, at 283; see also PharmaceuticalMfrs. Ass'n, 484
F. Supp. at 1182 (in enacting the FDCA, Congress "intended patients using prescription
drugs, as well as those using over-the-counter drugs, to receive" information directly).
158. See Comment, supra note 113, at 301-02.
159. According to FDA regulations, "[e]ach applicant shall promptly review all
adverse drug experience information obtained . . . from any source . . . including
information derived from commercial marketing experience, postmarketing clinical
investigations,... reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers
... . The applicant shall report to FDA adverse drug experience information." 21
C.F.R. § 314.80(b), (c) (1989) (emphasis added). In addition, "[tihe applicant shall
submit information about distributed products . . . to the FDA . . . [including] . . .
information concerning any bacteriological contamination, or any other significant...
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whether to warn airlines and/or passengers of risks of flying."6
The head of the FAA is given the power to formulate rules and
regulations for airline security in order to "protect persons and property
aboard aircraft .. against acts of criminal violence.""' Accordingly,
regulations must be for the "protection of passengers in air transportation
.. . and the public interest in the promotion of air transportation." 62
Regulations must also result in "uniform procedures for the inspection,
detention, and search of persons."" It is, therefore, inconsistent that
aviation law specifically addresses the lack of a duty to warn."
Courts have held drug manufacturers to an expert standard in their
field."
Since airlines are privy to classified FAA security bulletins,
change or deterioration in the . . . drug product." Id. § 314.81(a)(1) (emphasis added).
160. FAA regulations stipulate that "[tihe Administrator . . . shall prescribe such
reasonable rules and regulations. .. as he may deem necessary to protect persons and
property aboard aircraft . . . against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy." Air
Transportation Security Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis
added).
161. Id.
162. "In prescribing and amending rules and regulations... the Administrator shall
.. . consider whether any proposed rule or regulation is consistent with protection of
passengers in air transportation... against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy
and the public interest in the promotion of air transportation ......
Id. § 1357(a)(2).
Congress' rationale in enacting § 1357(a)(2) was stated as follows:
The recent increase in the criminal acts of
hijacking and sabotage of commercial aircraft has
had a significant impact and effect upon U.S. air
commerce . . . . [The very nature of such
criminal acts . . . almost always . . . involve[s]
the safety of passengers . . . . It is imperative,
therefore, that.., authority and responsibilitLy]
be precisely defined in order that . . . the
maximum guarantee of the safety of passenger.
. . is achieved ....
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1194, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3975, 4006.

163. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1357(a)(2)(C).
164. The Administrator of the FAA "shall prescribe such regulations as he may
deem necessary to prohibit disclosure of any information obtained or developed in the
conduct of research and development activities . . . if, in . . . [his opinion], the
disclosure of such information . . . would be detrimental to the safety of persons
traveling in air transportation." Id. § 1357(d)(2).
165. Swayze v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 807 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1987); Reyes
v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).

250

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

they also should be held to an expert standard.

[Vol. VIII

Drug manufacturers

cannot fail to warn of a drug's risks simply because the probability of its
occurrence is minimal." t
Yet, in aviation law, the FAA and the
airlines contemplate warning of terrorist threats only if the threat is

"specific and credible" and aimed at a particular flight."6 '
The relationship between the airline traveler and an airline is
analogous to the relationship between the non-prescription drug user and
a drug manufacturer. A non-prescription drug user actively chooses
whether or not to use a particular medication"M based in part on
information provided by the manufacturer." t
Similarly, an airline
passenger is actively involved in planning his airline flight as a result of
receiving information from the airline about special fares, discounts, or
even enhanced security." °
Therefore, since the airline and the
government have adequate means of contacting passengers in order to
warn them of any new threats, it is feasible to directly warn passengers
17
of terrorist activity prior to departure. 1

166. For example, in Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir.
1968), the manufacturer was forced to warn the ultimate consumer even when there was
only a 0.9 per million risk of harm from a polio vaccine. See also Givens v. Lederle,
556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977).
167. Flying Blind, supra note 49, § 5, at 3, col. 1.
168. See MacDonald, 394 Mass. at 143, 475 N.E.2d at 69.
169. See Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91.
170. See, e.g., Letter from C. Edward Acker, Chairman of the Board and Martin
R. Shugrue, Vice Chairman to Pan Am Travelers (June 1986) (available through Pan
American World Airways, Inc.).
171. The State Department has at least two potential mechanisms in place by which
to warn passengers. First, by dialing (202) 647-5225, the traveler can reach the
"Citizens Emergency Center," which alerts citizens to any travel advisories for a given
country or geographic region. An example of the type of warning afforded by this
service was a travel advisory for Kuwait which stated, "while hostilities have ceased
between Iran and Kuwait's neighbor ... Iraq, there is no formal peace agreement and
the potential for terrorist activity exists." To date, this service has not provided detailed
information regarding specific terrorist threats. Flying Blind, supra note 49, § 5, at 3,
col. 6. Second, the FAA has a toll-free consumer complaint number designed to hear
complaints about safety violations. Id. If a traveler calls this number to ask about any
threats against his or her airplane, he will receive the following message: "Travelers on
U.S. air carriers should be confident that all reasonable precautions are being taken to
insure that the highest level of security exists." Id.
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TARASOFF AND AVIATION LAW

Under the common law there is no affirmative duty to control
another's conduct or to warn his or her potential victims." Imposing
such a duty to warn of another human's dangerous propensities is
extremely difficult, especially when the relationship is that of a therapist
to his patient."i Yet, because the therapist is in a position to render an
opinion about dangerousness based on his patient's history and treatment
course,'1 4 courts have adopted the special relationship doctrine to carve
out exceptions to the common law rule when a therapist is in a special
relationship with either the foreseeable victim or a third party.1 75
In Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,76 the
California Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) § 315
requirement and imposed a duty upon a psychiatrist to warn intended
victims of a crime. 1" In Tarasoff, the patient had been under outpatient
psychiatric care. 17' A psychiatrist determined that the patient was a
threat to himself, the community at large, and an unnamed, yet
172. Goodman, From Tarasoffto Hopper: The Evolution of the Therapist'sDuty to
Protect Third Parties, 3 BEHAV. Sci. & L., 195, 207 n.60 (1984). Also, "[i]t appears
inevitable that, sooner or later, such extreme cases of morally outrageous and
indefensible conduct will arise that there will be further inroads upon the older rule."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 comment c (1965) (addressing the absence of

an affirmative duty to protect, i.e., to warn); see also Note, Affirmative Duties in Tort
Following Tarasoff, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 492, 498 n.21 (1984).
173. Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334,
345, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 25 (1976).
174. McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 482, 403 A.2d 500, 508 (1979).
175. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 425, 551 P.2d at 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 14; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) which provides:
There is no duty so to control the
conduct of a third person as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless:
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and
the third person which imposes a duty upon the
actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and
the other which gives to the other a right to
protection.
176. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
177. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
178. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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identifiable, girl. 1" Despite this clinical finding, the girl was never
warned by either the police or the therapist of such threats on her life." m
After the patient killed the girl, her parents sued the psychiatrist for
failing to warn their daughter of the patient's threats."'
Judge Tobriner articulated a two step test in failure to warn cases.
First, when a therapist determines or should have determined that a
patient has the capacity to pose a serious danger of violence to others, the
therapist has a duty to protect the readily identified victim."
Depending on the circumstances, this protection encompasses warning the
intended victim(s), notifying the police, or any remaining possibilities
which could help avert the consequences."a Under this test, a therapist
need not concern himself about the identity of any potential victim or
victims until he has made a determination that the patient poses a serious
danger to others. Only after a determination of dangerousness is made
does the therapist have "an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the
intended victim against such danger.""'
Courts have expanded the Tarasoff ruling in order to protect a
larger class of victims. In McIntosh v. Milano," 5 a New Jersey trial
court imposed a duty upon a therapist to take measures to protect potential
victims of his patient's violence.'" The court recognized that doctors
have an obligation to protect the welfare of the community from potential
evil.'"

Similarly, in Hedlund v. Superior Court,"'8 the California

Supreme Court outlined the boundaries of the class of potential victims
who must be warned under Tarasoff. 9 The first group to be warned
is the identifiable victim." The second group encompasses anyone who
is injured in an attack upon the identifiable victim and whose injures are
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (Law Div. 1979).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 489-90, 403 A.2d at 511-12.
188. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
189. Id. at 705-07, 669 P.2d at 46-47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11; see also Note,
supra note 172, at 501.
190. Note, supra note 172, at 501.
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considered to have been reasonably foreseeable to the therapist. 191
In order to insure more protection for potential victims, some
courts no longer require a specific victim to be named in order to mandate
a Tarasoff warning. In Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., a mentally
ill patient shot and killed persons in a crowded night club.'" In Lipari,
the court imposed a duty upon a therapist to take those precautions
reasonably necessary to protect potential victims of this patient.'"
Similarly, in Peterson v. State, 95 a therapist was ordered to take
precautions "to protect anyone who might foreseeably be endangered by
The court based its
[a patient's] drug-related mental problems."'"
expansion of the Tarasoff doctrine on the notion that foreseeable violence
may involve a class of persons at risk, and therapists have a duty to take
"reasonable precautions to protect anyone who might foreseeably be
endangered. " "

In assessing whether or not a Tarasoff duty should be imposed,
courts have looked at the foreseeability of harm to the victim, the degree
of certainty that the harm would occur, the closeness of connection
between the doctor's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, and the potential
consequences to the community at large.19 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals even imposed a duty to warn when a patient had not made any
specific threats to any specific individuals, but his previous history
indicated that he would probably direct his violence against a given
individual.'
In addition, the court recognized that there would be no
Although no one can
great burden in warning potential victims.'
absolutely predict another's actions, "the risk that unnecessary warnings
may be given is a reasonable price to pay for the lives of possible victims
that may be saved.""'

There are two elements in aviation terrorism which create an
analogy to the Tarasoff line of cases and, therefore, mandate the
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 193.
100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
Id. at 428, 671 P.2d at 237.
Id.
Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 511 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
See Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983).

200. Id.
201. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440, 511 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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imposition of a duty to warn. First, a duty can only be imposed if there
is a special relationship within the meaning of the Restatement (Second)
Of Torts.'
The special relationship between an airline and its
passengers is founded on the idea that since the carrier is monetarily
benefitted by the traveler, it accepts the duty to exercise reasonable care

towards its passengers.a

Similarly, an American airline traveler is in

a special relationship with the United States government and its agencies
such as the FAA.'
Secondly, a duty can only be imposed if a dangerous condition
exists. In the past twenty years, airline travelers have become the victims

of terrorism."
Terrorism is most commonly defined as violence
against innocent people, by members of a political or military group to
further their political or military goals." It is evident that the state or
country is the main target of terrorist activity, yet the airlines are attacked
because they are seen as an arm of the state.'
The Fifth Circuit
recognized that air piracy exceeds all other crimes in its potential for
devastating harm." 5 Airlines and governments are aware that aviation
terrorism is an ongoing type of foreseeable violence.'
The issue then arises whether such a system of warning would
compromise the secrecy and confidentiality of national intelligence. In

202. There is a special relation between the actor and a third party which gives the
third party a right to protection. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
203. See Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L.J. 886, 901 (1934).
204. "[Duty] is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is
entitled to protection." W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 332-33 (3d ed. 1964).
205. See Blakesley, Jurisdictionas Legal ProtectionAgainst Terrorism, 19 CONN.
L. REv. 1 (1987).
206. Id.
207. Aviation Security - First Major Airline Conferencefor 1987, IATA REv.,
Jan.-Mar. 1987, at 6. In addition, "lilt was an unprecedented assault on America and
American citizens, a terrorist crime ....
They were students, . . . mothers, fathers,
brothers, sisters." Hearings 1, supra note 15, at 5 (statement of Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg).
208. United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 48 (5th Cit. 1973). Airline sabotage
accounted for more than 25 % of all airline deaths in 1986. Id. In fact, airline sabotage
has reached the level of mechanical or human error in contributing to airline accidents.
Silets, Something Special in the Air and on the Ground, 53 J. Ant L. & CoM. 321, 323
n.3 (1987). Americans have been targets of 20% of terrorist attacks. The Next Bomb,
LIFE, Mar. 1989, at 130.
209. Silets, supra note 208, at 322-24.
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Tarasoff, the court addressed the issue of privilege and secrecy between
a doctor and patient and recognized the level of confidentiality present in
the patient-psychotherapist relationship."' The court concluded that
"the protective privilege ends where the public peril begins. "211
Likewise, the court noted that any risk that unnecessary warnings be given
212
is a reasonable price to pay to save the lives of potential victims.
Such reasoning should govern the relationship between the FAA and the
airlines and the airline passengers in aviation law.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Paternalism has been defined as "a system under which an
authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate conduct of those under
its control in matters affecting them as individuals as well as in their
relations to authority and to each other.1 21 3 Paternalism clearly is not
present in medical-legal issues, yet it rules aviation law and policy. In
other words, the medical community is not allowed to substitute its
judgment for that of a competent person, while the airline companies have
traditionally been granted that right. Death is a possible result of both
industries, yet the standard for who makes the decision is drastically
different. The medical community respects an individual's right to selfdetermination. Therefore, courts have imposed the doctrine of "informed
consent" by which a patient must give informed consent before ingesting
a drug or undergoing a procedure. After a procedure is completed, it is
only the patient who suffers the scars of pain, expense, and possibly death
which could result from the procedure. The medical community believes
it is the right of the patient to decide whether or not to submit to a
procedure.
An aviation system without a mandatory duty to warn passengers
of credible terrorist threats does not allow for an individual's selfdetermination. Although there are no significant differences between the
airline traveler and the medical patient, the government and the airlines
are wary about recognizing an air traveler's right to self-determination in
making a decision about whether or not to board an aircraft. In addition,
if an airline traveler is to give informed consent to fly, he or she must be
210. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
211. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27; M. PERLIN, supra note 90,
at 140.
212. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
213. WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 862 (9th ed. 1983).
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told of any credible terrorist threats involving his flight. It is his or her
right to know what dangers he or she may face before subjecting him or
herself to air travel. The FAA should adopt the FDA's reasoning for
regulation. If a warning is important enough to be included in the
physician-directed labeling, then there is no justification as to why
analogous warnings of terrorist activity would not benefit the airline
passenger. If the government, airlines, or courts admit that an airline
traveler possesses this right of self-determination, "failure to warn" of
credible terrorist threats can and will become a new tort.
With the increased danger of terrorism, the question becomes
whether the airlines and/or government have a duty to predict the conduct
of terrorists. Aviation law would not require an application of Tarasoff
as stringent as psychiatry does. Airlines would not be expected to predict
violent behavior from the terrorists. Rather the FAA would classify
threats as credible. The FAA would then disclose such threats to the
airlines with the intention that the airlines dispense such threats to the
foreseeable class of victims, namely airline travelers of the flight in
question.
Until aviation law is restructured to impose a duty to warn
passengers of credible terrorist threats, Pan American Flight 103 will
symbolize an on-going deprivation of rights faced by all airline travelers.
Like medicine and medical procedures, air travel has become a constant
in our everyday lives. Not warning a passenger of terrorist threats, is
similar to blindfolding a patient in front of a full medicine cabinet. The
patient has no sense to what medicine he is subjecting himself, nor is he
aware of the possibility of deadly risks. Pan American Flight 103 is a
symbol -- a call for the FAA and the airlines to take the blindfolds off the
passengers.
Cynthia Dokas

